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This book offers insightful discussions on topics that have long been central to the metaphysics of 
modality. It is written with laudable clarity, and designed to satisfy both expert and less expert 
readers.    
Mackie defends here, with a Lewisian methodology, a rather unorthodox and controversial 
essentialist view about individuals that she labels ‘Minimalist Essentialism’ (ME), and also 
‘Fairly Extreme Haecceitism’ (166). According to ME, essential properties are minimal both in 
terms of quantity and in terms of the constraints they impose on how things might have been. In 
relation to its title, the book argues that things might have been in far more ways than we usually 
believe—although Aristotle could not have been a number, he could have been a poached egg 
(155).   
Theories on the metaphysics of modality can be ordered by strength in terms of their 
consequences as regards to the existence of essential properties. The strongest theories in this 
spectrum are those committed to individual essences; i.e., essential properties that are also unique 
to the individual that possesses them (18). Following them, there are theories that, while not 
committed to individual essences, are nonetheless committed to non-trivial essential properties 
such as, for instance, those derived from principles like Necessity of Origin (37). In a weaker 
position there is Sortal Essentialism. ME is a rather weak thesis: although it entails the existence 
of some essential properties, it entails very few of them. ME is therefore somewhat stronger than 
(Extreme) Extreme Haecceitism (EEH), understood as a thesis that denies even those few 
essential properties that ME entails. According to Mackie, EEH is indefensible (166), and she 
emphasizes that ME must not be equated with it (165-6). Mackie uses this ordering to structure 
her book, especially the eight central chapters that contain her main argument for ME. Chapter 1 
offers some preliminaries, while Chapter 10 discusses natural kind essentialism (NKE) and 
concludes that semantic theories of natural kind terms like Kripke’s or Putnam’s do not commit 
us to NKE. 
I will focus here on the argument for ME, as developed in Chapters 2-9. Mackie starts by 
considering the strongest thesis she wants to argue against; namely, the thesis that there are 
individual essences. This first argument is four chapters long (Chapters 2 to 5), and is structured 
as follows. By using Forbes’ contribution to the debate, she argues, in Chapter 2, for the 
following disjunctive claim (39): Either we (i) abandon de re modality in terms of identity across 
possible worlds, or (ii) find plausible candidates to fill the role of individual essences, or (iii) 
allow for Bare Identities, or (iv) allow trans-world identities to be extrinsically determined. Her 
option, in line with ME but not yet equivalent to it, is (iii).  
Chapter 3 argues, against option (ii), that there are no plausible candidates to fill the role of 
individual essences. Mackie uses here Forbes’ treatment (in [2]) of the reduplication argument, 
but draws opposite conclusions by casting doubts on two premises of Forbes. The first premise 
(the thesis that identity cannot be extrinsically grounded) is discussed, and accepted, in Chapter 4. 
With this, Mackie rules out option (iv). She considers Counterpart Theory in Chapter 5 and 
argues that, on examination, Counterpart Theory is no real alternative to (iii): “[Lewis] does, in 
effect, allow that there can be haecceitistic or ‘bare’ differences between possibilities” (89). At 
the end of Chapter 5, therefore, the only option still available is her own, the option of endorsing 
Bare Identities. This option amounts to the negation of Forbes’ second premise (the No Bare 
Identities Principle) and it also amounts to the denial of individual essences. At this stage of the 
book, Mackie has already argued against the strongest of the theses rival to hers.  
However, position (iii) is still compatible with theories stronger than ME: “Even if there are no 
conditions that are non-trivially sufficient for an individual's identity in all possible worlds, there 
might nevertheless be non-trivial necessary conditions for its identity in all possible worlds” (92). 
Consequently, Chapter 6 makes one more step towards ME by arguing against Necessity of 
Origin, or, more precisely, by arguing against arguments for it. Typically, arguments for the 
Necessity of Origin make use either of sufficiency principles (which, in combination with 
essential properties, generate individual essences) or of a Branching Model of de re possibilities. 
Examples of the first type of argument are Kripke’s and Salmon’s, whereas McGinn offers an 
example of the second kind. Given the content of the preceding chapters (against individual 
essences), Mackie is able to ignore in Chapter 6 the former kind of arguments (which she would 
have dealt with indirectly), and this is probably the reason why she only focuses here on McGinn-
style arguments. She concludes that we have no good reason to accept Necessity of Origin. But 
again, the not-yet-ruled-out truth of Sortal Essentialism would still be stronger than ME and, 
furthermore, its truth would not be incompatible with the falsity of Necessity of Origin (i.e., even 
if Aristotle’s origins were contingent, it could still be the case that he is essentially a human 
being). Accordingly, Chapters 7 and 8 are Mackie’s final steps to ME. In Chapter 7, she argues 
against Brody’s arguments for Sortal Essentialism, whereas Wiggin’s arguments are examined, 
and rejected, in Chapter 8.   
The negative case for ME ends here and, in Chapter 9, Mackie follows Lewis’ suggestion ([3], 
239) of positively arguing for ME by saying that, although the far-fetched possibilities are indeed 
possibilities, “they are, for normal purposes of counterfactual speculation, ignored” (155). Like 
Lewis, Mackie is aware that her position lacks intuitive appeal, and to counter this she addresses, 
at the end of this chapter, the “incredulous stare”, making serious efforts to explain away 
(essentialist) intuitions against ME.  
Mackie is also explicitly aware that the argument she offers for ME is basically a negative 
argument: she considers and rejects alternative theories, intending to leave only ME standing. But 
how exhaustive is Mackie’s negative case? Not exhaustive enough, I suspect. Let me elaborate 
this by first addressing a different, but directly related, issue. Given the ordering mentioned 
above, one may worry that Chapter 6 is redundant. For, if Sortal Essentialism is the weakest of 
the theories stronger than ME that Mackie wants to reject, Chapters 7 and 8 should themselves 
imply the conclusions Mackie is arguing for in Chapter 6. That is, if Sortal Essentialism is false, 
then surely Necessity of Origin is false as well. But do Chapters 7 and 8 imply the falsity of 
Necessity of Origin? They would, if Mackie’s arguments against Sortal Essentialism provided 
principled reasons against it, rather than merely countering particular arguments for it. Indeed, 
even if Mackie’s rejection of Brody’s and Wiggins’ arguments for Sortal Essentialism is 
adequate, Sortal Essentialism might still be true. It is probably to make this gap smaller that 
Chapter 6 is not redundant after all. Its non-redundancy, however, comes at the cost of 
exhaustivity, and this substantially affects Mackie’s overall argument for ME. Another way in 
which the lack of exhaustivity threatens her strategy comes from the fact that she does not 
consider routes to Necessity of Origin other than, directly, the McGinn-style one and, indirectly, 
the Kripkean one (based on sufficiency principles). Other, more recent routes, however, have 
been suggested1, and, although I myself think that they are problematic in other ways, Mackie 
should include them in her discussion to strengthen her negative arguments for ME.  
The final worry I want to mention is epistemological. Mackie convincingly shows that the 
essentialist theories she considers do not succeed in proving the existence of essential properties. 
A modal agnostic might take this as supporting the claim that we might not be able to know 
whether there are essential properties. Mackie’s reaction is not as moderate. She concludes, 
incompatibly with modal agnosticism, that there are not substantial essential properties. One 
might well suppose that here Mackie is reading too much into the failure of the theories she 
considers. 
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1
 According to Chalmers [1] and Yablo [5], conceivability exercises would allow us to establish Essentialist 
Principles. Rohrbaugh and deRosset [4] offer an argument for Necessity of Origin that explicitly tries to 
avoid both sufficiency principles and the branching model by using instead what they call ‘the locality of 
prevention thesis’. 
